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Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar's recent criticism of the Supreme Court regarding its setting of timelines for the President to act on Bills referred by Governors represents a departure from fair criticism and ventures into the realm of unwarranted intimidation. Dhankhar's remarks, including questioning where the country is heading and labeling Article 142 a "nuclear missile" against democratic forces, are characterized as overly alarmist and misrepresent the Supreme Court's intent. The core of the issue revolves around the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive branches, and whether the Supreme Court's actions constitute an overreach into the domain of the President. This analysis will delve into the constitutional framework, previous Supreme Court precedents, and the specific circumstances surrounding the present case to argue that Dhankhar's critique is unfounded and potentially detrimental to the principles of democratic governance.
One of the central pillars of the argument against the Vice President's position rests on the understanding of the President's role within the Indian constitutional system. The President, under Article 74, is bound to act on the aid and advice of the Union Council of Ministers. This mandatory provision effectively renders the President a titular head, lacking independent decision-making power. Functionally, the President is more akin to a figurehead than the Governor, who retains certain areas of individual discretion. Given this framework, the Supreme Court's direction to the President regarding timelines for bill assent is, in essence, a direction to the Union Government. Framing this as a blow to democratic norms, as Dhankhar has done, is an exaggeration that disregards the fundamental operational mechanics of the Indian government. It wrongly assumes that the President is an independent entity operating entirely outside the purview of government advice, and unaccountable for delays. To reinforce this point, the author cites the Rameshwar Prasad case (2006) and SR Bommai case, where the SC held judicial review on Presidential decisions under Article 356 did not bar judicial review, and that Article 361 did not prevent the Court from determining if sufficient materials were used by the President, respectively. This highlights that the SC's intent is not to diminish the office of the President.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's intervention in setting timelines for presidential action is not without precedent. The Shatrughan Chauhan case established the principle that the President must decide mercy petitions of death row convicts within a reasonable time, and unreasonable delays could lead to the commutation of death penalties. Similarly, the Balwant Singh case set a deadline for a decision on a President's mercy petition. These cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has consistently held the executive branch accountable for timely decision-making, even at the highest levels. In the State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil Nadu case, the Supreme Court's direction on bill assent timelines is thus an extension of this established jurisprudence. It is also important to consider the specific context in which the Supreme Court issued its directives. State Bills had been kept pending for years without explanation, leading to a legislative deadlock. The Supreme Court's intervention was aimed at preventing this constitutional paralysis, not at undermining the office of the President. The reference to the State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil Nadu is vital, as this showcases the SC's adoption of timelines the Ministry of Home Affairs had already prescribed, suggesting no novel intervention, rather a reinforcement of the government's timeline.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's timelines were not arbitrarily imposed but were based on recommendations from the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions, as well as existing guidelines issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The fact that the Court adopted timelines suggested by the government itself further undermines the Vice President's criticism. The article cites the Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum dated 04.02.2016, which said that 'A time limit of maximum 3 months be strictly adhered to for finalising the Bills after their receipt from the State Government', showcasing the Court adopting this guideline. This context is crucial for understanding the rationale behind the Court's decision and for dispelling the notion that it was acting without a reasonable basis. The article then also directly quotes the Supreme Court ruling, further strengthening the SC's intent.
The Vice President's questioning of the judgment's legitimacy due to it not being delivered by a five-judge bench is also addressed. While Article 145(3) mandates a five-judge bench for cases involving a substantial question of law regarding constitutional interpretation, the principles laid down in this case were not novel. The Court followed a long line of judgments, including those from Shamsher Singh vs State of Punjab (7-judge bench) and SR Bommai (5-judge bench). Furthermore, the view that the Governor cannot exercise pocket veto and must return the Bill to the Assembly is an application of a recent judgment in the Punjab Governor case (3-judge bench). The argument that a Bill re-enacted by the Assembly is binding on the Governor stems directly from Article 200. Regarding the timelines, as previously noted, the Court was adopting guidelines prescribed by the Union Government itself. Moreover, none of the parties involved, including the Union Government, requested that the matter be referred to a five-judge bench during the hearing. It is also important to note that the Court's power under Article 32, which is a fundamental right, supersedes technical or procedural considerations.
The Vice President's suggestion to amend Article 145(3) to require a Constitution Bench comprising at least half the total strength of the Supreme Court is deemed "preposterously unviable." This highlights the impracticality and potential disruption that such a proposal would entail. The article further poses the question of what prejudice is caused by the Supreme Court's directions, and rhetorically asks if the Vice President believes Bills should be kept in limbo indefinitely. The article implies that the VP believes that Bills should be kept in limbo, despite the Union Government's own concerns about such delays, which is evident from communications extracted in the judgment. The author uses this point to suggest that the VP's criticism is disingenuous, especially in the context of the Union Government's initial intention to address the same problem.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court's direction on bill assent timelines is not an affront to democracy but a safeguard for it. It is an antidote to constitutional paralysis, not a "nuclear missile" against democratic forces. The Vice President's remarks, particularly his use of alarmist language and distortion of established legal principles, are detrimental to democratic discourse. His questioning of Justice Yashwant Varma's case, when juxtaposed with his criticisms against the judgment, appears to be a smear campaign with the intent to discredit the judiciary as a whole. It is imperative for high constitutional functionaries to engage in informed, temperate, and constitutionally grounded criticism. By resorting to hyperbole and misrepresenting legal principles, they undermine the very fabric of democratic discourse they claim to defend. Ultimately, the Supreme Court's judgment aims to prevent a legislative deadlock and ensure the smooth functioning of the government, and not to diminish the office of the President.
The article uses powerful and direct language to rebut the Vice President's claims. It methodically dissects his arguments, using legal precedent, constitutional provisions, and the government's own policies to demonstrate the fallacy of his position. The author adopts an assertive tone, portraying the Vice President's diatribe as unwarranted and potentially harmful to democratic institutions. The article also critiques the VP's mentioning of the Justice Yashwant Varma issue, labeling it mala fides and a slander campaign. Overall, the author believes the Supreme Court's intervention aims to prevent legislative paralysis, maintain democratic accountability, and ensure the effective functioning of the government.