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The Supreme Court's judgment on April 8, 2025, concerning the long-standing dispute between the Governor of Tamil Nadu and the state's government and Legislative Assembly, represents a crucial intervention in the ongoing debate surrounding the balance of power within India's federal structure. The core issue revolved around the Governor's prolonged inaction on bills passed by the State Legislative Assembly. For years, the Governor had neither assented to these bills, returned them for reconsideration, nor referred them to the President, effectively employing a “pocket veto.” This inaction prompted the Supreme Court to intervene, leading to the eventual return of the bills for reconsideration. Subsequently, the Governor referred the bills to the President after the Assembly re-passed them. At the time of the Supreme Court's judgment, the President had assented to one bill, withheld assent from seven, and remained undecided on two. This situation is not unique to Tamil Nadu, as clashes between centrally-appointed Governors and state legislative assemblies have become increasingly common in states governed by opposition parties. Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision transcends the specific case of Tamil Nadu and addresses broader tensions inherent in India's federal system. The Supreme Court, in a comprehensive 415-page judgment, unequivocally stated that the Governor's actions were unjustified and inconsistent with the Constitution. The Court clarified that Governors do not possess the power to veto or pocket veto bills passed by the State Legislative Assembly. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Governors cannot initially return a bill to the State Legislature and then subsequently refer it to the President, emphasizing that only one course of action is permissible, with the latter option subject to specific constitutional conditions. The Supreme Court also addressed the President's role in considering state bills, stating that assent could not be withheld without a constitutionally valid reason, such as inconsistency with central law. This interpretation, according to the Court, best respects the will of the people of the states, as expressed through their elected representatives in the State Legislative Assembly, and adequately upholds India's federal structure. However, the Supreme Court went beyond simply interpreting the law. It established specific timelines for Governors and the President to consider and act upon state bills, contingent on the nature of the action required (assent, referral, or return). These timelines are not explicitly prescribed in the Constitution. Additionally, finding that the Governor had acted without bona fides and that years had passed since the bills were initially submitted, the Court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to do "complete justice" and declared that the bills were deemed to have been passed and were now law. The Tamil Nadu government promptly notified the Acts and brought them into force. This aspect of the Supreme Court's decision has generated significant controversy, with critics arguing that the Court exceeded its constitutional remit by prescribing timelines where none existed and by effectively enacting the pending bills, encroaching on the functions of other branches of government. Conversely, proponents of the Court's actions argue that the Governor's prolonged and unjustified delay left the Court with no other viable option. To understand the significance of the Court's decision, it is essential to consider the underlying constitutional design that has fostered these tensions.
The Indian Constitution reflects the historical context in which it was created, marked by inherent tensions. While the framers of the Constitution were committed to establishing a federal and parliamentary system of governance, prominent members of the Constituent Assembly, including Jawaharlal Nehru, B.R. Ambedkar, and Vallabhbhai Patel, harbored centralist tendencies. They aimed to ensure that even as the Constitution devolved power horizontally (away from the executive to representative bodies) and vertically (away from the Centre to the States), ultimate control would remain with a strong, unitary executive. To achieve this, the framers drew upon colonial constitutional instruments, which prioritized executive supremacy. Throughout the early 20th century, under pressure from the Indian national movement, the British gradually introduced representative institutions and proto-legislatures. However, they consistently maintained ultimate control through the British-appointed executive, who possessed the authority to override representative institutions to safeguard the interests of the British Empire. The colonial governors played a crucial role in this system, tasked with managing nationalist aspirations within the provinces, as expressed through provincial legislatures. While the framers of the Indian Constitution did not adopt the colonial institution of the Governor wholesale, they retained its form. By creating two distinct poles of authority at the federal level—the Centrally-appointed Governor and the elected State Legislature—the Constitution inevitably created a system susceptible to tension and conflict. One potential solution to these tensions would have been to adopt a strategy employed elsewhere in the Constitution: extensive codification and detailed rules governing the exercise and limitation of power. However, in relation to the structures of government—the legislature, the executive, and the Governor—the framers chose not to codify, instead leaving the matter to be governed by unwritten constitutional conventions. This choice was not neutral, as the failure to explicitly limit the exercise of power resulted in critical silences within the Constitution. These silences could be, and were, exploited by actors who disregarded constitutional conventions. The issue before the Supreme Court stemmed from this flawed constitutional design. The Constitution did not explicitly prevent Governors from engaging in pocket vetoes. Consequently, the system relied heavily on good faith, and the moment a Governor chose to exploit these constitutional silences, the entire federal structure was vulnerable to being undermined.
The Supreme Court's judgment can be viewed as a judicial attempt to rectify a defective constitutional design. The choices made during the framing of the Constitution were leading to a situation where the principles of federalism and representative democracy were being reduced to a mere formality. Without external intervention, the system was at risk of collapsing. Within the Indian system, the judiciary is the only body capable of providing such intervention. However, the Court's judgment is not without its flaws. By taking the actions it did, the Court expanded its own powers, granting itself the authority to enforce timelines, decide on exceptions to those timelines, and adjudicate intra-State organ conflicts. This suggests that such intervention is not sustainable in the long term. Piecemeal attempts to correct a flawed constitutional design will inevitably lead to unintended consequences elsewhere. What is required is an urgent and comprehensive discussion about the centralizing tendencies within the Constitution and whether the choices made in 1949 remain relevant today. A starting point for this discussion could be to question the continued necessity of the office of the Governor in 2025. In the meantime, the Court's judgment should not be seen as an instance of gratuitous overreach but rather as a temporary solution, a band-aid, for a wound that requires deeper and more long-term treatment. The decision highlights the inherent tensions in the Indian Constitution, born from its historical context. The Supreme Court's intervention, while controversial, underscores the judiciary's role in safeguarding the principles of federalism and representative democracy. The need for a comprehensive reevaluation of the constitutional design remains paramount to ensure a more balanced and functional federal structure in the future. The court’s actions, while potentially exceeding its prescribed authority, were arguably necessary to prevent the erosion of democratic principles and maintain the integrity of the Indian federal system in the face of deliberate obstructionism.
Furthermore, the court's reliance on Article 142, which grants it the power to do "complete justice," is a significant point of contention. While this provision allows the court to address extraordinary circumstances and ensure fairness, critics argue that its invocation in this case sets a potentially dangerous precedent. They fear that it could embolden the court to overstep its boundaries and encroach upon the legislative and executive domains, blurring the lines of separation of powers. The debate surrounding the Supreme Court's judgment also raises fundamental questions about the role of constitutional conventions in the Indian legal system. Constitutional conventions are unwritten rules or practices that guide the conduct of government officials and institutions. They are not legally binding but are considered essential for the smooth functioning of the Constitution. In this case, the Governor's disregard for established conventions regarding the timely consideration of bills exposed the vulnerability of the system and prompted the court to intervene. The judgment highlights the importance of upholding constitutional conventions and the potential consequences of their violation. It also underscores the need for a more robust framework for enforcing these conventions, as their absence can lead to constitutional crises. The Supreme Court's decision has far-reaching implications for the relationship between the Centre and the States in India. It reinforces the importance of respecting the autonomy of State Legislative Assemblies and upholding the principles of federalism. However, it also raises concerns about the potential for judicial overreach and the need for a more nuanced understanding of the separation of powers. The long-term impact of the judgment will depend on how it is interpreted and applied in future cases. It is crucial for all stakeholders to engage in a constructive dialogue to address the underlying constitutional issues and ensure a more balanced and harmonious relationship between the Centre and the States. Ultimately, the Supreme Court's intervention serves as a reminder of the dynamic and evolving nature of constitutional interpretation and the ongoing need to adapt the Constitution to meet the challenges of a changing society. The judgment underscores the importance of safeguarding the principles of democracy, federalism, and the rule of law in India.