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The Supreme Court of India's recent judgment in The State of Tamil Nadu vs The Governor of Tamil Nadu and Anr. represents a landmark clarification of the powers and limitations inherent in the office of the Governor. The court, comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan, unequivocally reaffirmed that the Governor is neither a mere extension of the Union government nor an independent power broker, but rather a constitutional functionary bound by the principles of democracy and the rule of law. This judgment arrives at a crucial juncture in Indian politics, where the relationship between state governments and Governors has frequently been fraught with tension and disagreement, particularly in states governed by parties different from the ruling party at the center. The core issue addressed by the Court was the Governor's inaction on several bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly. These bills, some dating back to 2020, languished without the Governor's assent, effectively stalling the legislative process and prompting the state government to seek judicial intervention. Among the contentious bills were those aimed at curtailing the Governor's authority in appointing Vice-Chancellors to state universities, a point of ongoing contention between the Raj Bhavan and the elected government. The Governor's prolonged delay in acting on these bills, followed by a belated referral of some to the President of India, raised serious questions about the constitutional propriety of his actions and the potential subversion of the democratic will of the people of Tamil Nadu. The Court's response was both a validation of the state legislature's authority and a powerful reminder of the Governor's constitutional responsibilities. By asserting that the Governor's office, while significant, is not exempt from the demands of representative democracy, the Court underscored the importance of federalism and the separation of powers in the Indian constitutional framework. The judgment effectively declared that indefinitely withholding assent to bills without valid reason is an act that undermines the very foundation of federalism and imperils the constitutional order. This interpretation significantly curtails the discretionary powers of the Governor and reinforces the principle that the Governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in narrowly defined circumstances explicitly outlined in the Constitution.
The constitutional basis for the dispute centered on the interpretation of Article 200 of the Constitution, which outlines the procedure for a Governor's assent to bills passed by the state legislature. Article 200 stipulates that the Governor may grant assent, withhold assent and return the bill for reconsideration, or reserve the bill for the President's consideration. The Union government, in its response to Tamil Nadu's petition, argued that the first proviso to Article 200 granted the Governor an additional, independent option: to simply withhold assent without any further action. This interpretation would effectively grant the Governor an absolute veto power over state legislation, a power that the Court explicitly rejected. The Court, referencing its earlier judgment in State of Punjab vs Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab (2023), clarified that the proviso to Article 200 does not confer any independent power on the Governor. Once a bill is passed by the Assembly, the Governor is limited to the three options outlined in the main text of Article 200: assent, reservation for the President, or withholding assent with a return of the bill for reconsideration. The Union government also argued that the Governor possesses autonomous discretion in deciding whether to reserve a bill for the President's assent. The Court refuted this claim as well, drawing attention to the debates in the Constituent Assembly. The original draft of Article 200 (then Article 175) had explicitly included the phrase "may, in his discretion" when referring to the Governor's power to reserve a bill for the President's consideration. The conscious omission of this phrase in the final version of the Constitution was interpreted by the Court as a deliberate effort to ensure that the Governor's role remains constrained by the advice of the elected executive. The Court identified only three specific circumstances in which the Governor can act without ministerial counsel: when a bill derogates from the powers of a High Court (under the second proviso to Article 200), when a bill falls within a class for which presidential assent is explicitly mandated (such as under Article 31C), and when a bill fundamentally undermines constitutional values. Even in these limited circumstances, the Court emphasized that the Governor's actions remain subject to judicial review, citing its earlier judgment in Rameshwar Prasad vs Union of India (2006). The Court reasoned that granting the Governor unchecked discretionary power would effectively paralyze the legislative process, allowing the Governor to indefinitely stall bills while hiding behind the cloak of gubernatorial immunity, thereby holding the governance of the state hostage.
In the specific case of the Tamil Nadu bills, the Court found that the Governor had no valid grounds for exercising discretion. Having chosen to withhold assent, he could not then refer the bills to the President after they were re-presented to him. The Court noted the absence of any executive advice supporting the Governor's actions and the lack of any identifiable constitutional rationale for his decisions. Given the Governor's unconstitutional actions and the substantial time that had elapsed, the Court faced a dilemma. While it could have issued a writ of mandamus compelling the Governor to grant assent to the bills, it deemed a more decisive intervention necessary to ensure complete justice. Exercising its power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court declared that the ten bills would be deemed to have been assented to on the date when they were re-presented to the Governor. This decision, while potentially viewed by some as judicial overreach, was justified by the Court as a necessary measure to remedy the Governor's deliberate obstruction of the legislative process and to uphold the democratic will of the people of Tamil Nadu. The alternative, a writ of mandamus, might have proven ineffective, as the Court lacks the power to hold the Governor in contempt. The Court's ultimate direction effectively stated that upon the bills being passed anew by the State Assembly and the Council of Ministers recommending their assent, the Governor was left with no discretion in the matter. This judgment carries significant implications for the balance of power between the Union government and the states, as well as for the role of the Governor in the Indian constitutional system. It serves as a crucial reminder that the Governor, though appointed by the Union government, functions on the aid and advice of the State executive and must act as a constitutional sentinel, upholding the values of representative democracy rather than serving as a source of political disputes. The judgment reaffirms the foundational principles of Indian federalism and reinforces the accountability of constitutional functionaries to the rule of law.