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The decision by India to hold the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 “in abeyance” marks a significant escalation in the already strained relations between India and Pakistan. This move, ostensibly a response to a brutal terrorist attack in south Kashmir’s Pahalgam, has far-reaching implications for Pakistan, a nation heavily reliant on the Indus river system for its water needs. The Indus Waters Treaty, a water-sharing agreement brokered by the World Bank in 1960, has been a cornerstone of stability in the region for over six decades, surviving multiple wars and periods of intense hostility between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. India’s decision to suspend the treaty throws this stability into question and opens up a Pandora's Box of potential consequences for both countries. Pakistan has reacted strongly to India’s decision, warning that any disruption to its water supply would be considered an “act of war.” Jal Shakti minister CR Patil has claimed that the Indian government will ensure that “not a drop of water” goes to Pakistan. While such rhetoric is commonplace in the current geopolitical climate, the underlying reality is that India’s position as an upper riparian state gives it considerable leverage over Pakistan’s water supply. The treaty allocated the waters of the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum rivers to Pakistan, while granting India the use of the Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas rivers. However, India was also permitted to use the western rivers for domestic and agricultural purposes, as well as for generating hydroelectricity through run-of-the-river projects. Suspending the treaty implies that India is no longer bound by these restrictions and can potentially control, regulate, or even block the flow of water into Pakistan. This has the potential to devastate Pakistan's agriculture, which is heavily dependent on the Indus river system's irrigation network. A large part of Pakistan’s agriculture is dependent on the irrigation system and network of canals built around the Indus river system. The immediate impact could be felt in the short term, as Indian engineers could manipulate existing water-control infrastructure to harm Pakistani agriculture. For example, by refilling reservoirs upstream and reducing downstream flows at the beginning of the crop-sowing season, India could create significant water shortages for Pakistani farmers. In the long term, India could build new dams with large storage reservoirs, which would further reduce the amount of water available to Pakistan. This would require significant time and resources, but the potential impact on Pakistan's economy and livelihoods would be substantial. Under the Indus Water Treaty, India has to share hydrological data with Pakistan so that the neighbouring country can predict floods and plan its irrigation needs accordingly. Now, India simply has no legal obligations to do that. The disagreement over the water-sharing may also change the nature of politics in both the countries. A substantial chunk of the Indus river system flows through Jammu and Kashmir. As a result, Kashmir may become even more central to the discourse between the two neighbours. “The narrative of upper riparian India blocking water will be used for mobilisation and populist purposes,” pointed out Dr Medha Bisht, associate professor at South Asian University, New Delhi. “Why Kashmir is important for Pakistan’s survival might also come to the fore.”
Despite the potential for serious disruption, experts caution against assuming that India can immediately cut off Pakistan's water supply. Building large dams in the seismically fragile Western Himalaya region poses significant risks, including the displacement of people, threat to livelihoods, and other environmental aspects. Moreover, any water-control infrastructure has the possibility of being breached. It’s worth remembering that the western Himalayas are highly seismically active, too, so the possibility of earthquakes damaging dams, canals, and thereby causing floods has to be considered. The suspension of the treaty also allows India to design and power projects that can store a lot of water, which gives it leverage over the flow of water to Pakistan. “If the Indian government decides not to reinstate the treaty in the longer term it could press ahead with different designs for Kishenganga and other projects.” The Indus Water Treaty had largely remained insulated from multiple wars, terrorist attacks and other skirmishes between the two nuclear-armed rivals. In fact, the treaty is widely considered as one of the longest-standing agreements between two countries over a transboundary river system. But in recent years, the hostile relationship between the two neighbours has taken a toll on the pact. Last year, India had sent a formal notice to Pakistan, seeking renegotiation of the treaty. Pakistan has repeatedly raised objections over the power projects built by India on the western rivers, even though the treaty allows it to. The dispute over the two power projects has dragged on for years owing to the differences in the implementation of the dispute-resolution mechanisms underlined within the treaty. For example, in case of a dispute between the two countries, the first platform to solve the issue is the Permanent Indus Commission. In case the commission fails to resolve the dispute, a “neutral expert” could also be appointed on the request of either commissioner to decide on the issue. If there’s no solution from the expert, then both the countries or either of them can request the constitution of an International Court of Arbitration to solve the differences. In the case of Kishanganga and Ratle, while India wanted each step of the resolution mechanism to be exhausted completely, Pakistan showed a greater urgency to escalate the dispute to other platforms of resolution as it considered Delhi was not addressing its concerns properly. Before the Pahalgam attack, even with the lingering differences over interpretation of the dispute resolution mechanism, both the countries were bound to comply with the treaty. That may have changed now.
One of the key aspects of the Indus Water Treaty is the dispute-resolution mechanism. The treaty outlines a tiered process for resolving disputes, starting with the Permanent Indus Commission, followed by a neutral expert, and ultimately, the International Court of Arbitration. However, India and Pakistan have repeatedly clashed over the interpretation and implementation of these mechanisms, leading to prolonged disputes over projects like the Kishanganga and Ratle hydropower projects. The ongoing disagreements over these projects underscore the inherent complexities in managing transboundary water resources, particularly in a region marked by deep-seated mistrust and political tensions. Even though it was signed way back in 1960, the Indus Water Treaty had largely remained insulated from multiple wars, terrorist attacks and other skirmishes between the two nuclear-armed rivals. In fact, the treaty is widely considered as one of the longest-standing agreements between two countries over a transboundary river system. But in recent years, the hostile relationship between the two neighbours has taken a toll on the pact. Last year, India had sent a formal notice to Pakistan, seeking renegotiation of the treaty. Pakistan has repeatedly raised objections over the power projects built by India on the western rivers, even though the treaty allows it to. The dispute over the two power projects has dragged on for years owing to the differences in the implementation of the dispute-resolution mechanisms underlined within the treaty. For example, in case of a dispute between the two countries, the first platform to solve the issue is the Permanent Indus Commission. In case the commission fails to resolve the dispute, a “neutral expert” could also be appointed on the request of either commissioner to decide on the issue. If there’s no solution from the expert, then both the countries or either of them can request the constitution of an International Court of Arbitration to solve the differences.
From a legal standpoint, experts argue that India has not technically exited the treaty, as there is no explicit exit clause. However, by putting the treaty in “abeyance,” India is signaling its intention to disregard its obligations under the agreement. This raises questions about the legal ramifications and the potential involvement of third parties, such as the World Bank, which played a crucial role in brokering the treaty. One of the ways India might be implementing the “abeyance” of the Indus Water Treaty is by not taking Pakistan on board while constructing the Ratle power project, experts said. Not only that. After the scrapping of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status and statehood in 2019, New Delhi has cleared eight more hydropower projects in Ladakh. “It is possible that India can choose not to consider Pakistan's concerns,” pointed out Srinivas Chokkakula, president and chief executive of the Centre for Policy Research think tank. Chokkakula, who leads the transboundary rivers, ecologies, and development studies programme at CPR, however, pointed out that New Delhi has not explained what it actually means by “abeyance”. “…It is not easy to control or deviate water flows without significant investments in infrastructure. But there are other ways that the abeyance can impact,” Chokkakula said. “That depends on what India chooses to do under 'abeyance.' It is best to await specific details about the measures India takes instead of speculating on it.” The implications of India’s decision extend beyond the immediate impact on Pakistan's water supply. It also has the potential to affect India’s reputation as an internationally responsible state. The Indus Waters Treaty has long been seen as a model of successful conflict resolution, and India’s unilateral decision to suspend it could damage its credibility in the eyes of the international community. Moreover, it could embolden other countries, such as China, to use their position as upstream nations to India’s disadvantage, particularly in the context of the Brahmaputra river. Building dams in a challenging terrain like Jammu and Kashmir has many potential risks, including displacement of people, threat to livelihoods and other environmental aspects, experts pointed out. “It will affect the downstream communities within India as well – the local biodiversity, groundwater and economy,” pointed out Thakkar. The possibility of earthquakes damaging dams, canals, and thereby causing floods has to be considered. In conclusion, India's decision to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance is a high-stakes gamble with potentially far-reaching consequences. While it may offer India short-term leverage in its relationship with Pakistan, it also carries significant risks, including damage to its international reputation and the potential for escalating tensions in a region already fraught with conflict. The future of the Indus Waters Treaty, and the stability it has provided for over six decades, now hangs in the balance.
Source: How India’s withdrawal from Indus Water Treaty can hurt Pakistan