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The article highlights a significant security lapse in the Kathua district of Jammu and Kashmir, revealing how Pakistani terrorist groups are exploiting the lack of a robust counter-insurgency grid in the region. Kathua, strategically located at the trijunction of J&K, Punjab, and Himachal Pradesh, suffers from a “security vacuum” because it doesn't fall under the operational command of the 16 Corps, which is responsible for the Line of Control (LoC) in the Jammu division. This leaves the hinterland plains of the International Border (IB) and the upper reaches vulnerable to infiltration. Unlike the LoC, Kathua lacks a ‘reception area,’ a tightly networked grid spearheaded by the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), to detect, ambush, and eliminate terrorists who manage to cross the IB. The absence of this critical layer of security allows Pakistani terrorist groups, such as the Kashmir Tigers (a front for Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Toiba), to infiltrate and move into the upper reaches of Kathua with relative ease. The consequences of this security gap were vividly illustrated by the operation in the Jakhole-Juthana area on March 27, 2025, where security forces incurred losses while engaging the infiltrating terrorists. The terrorists' ability to evade initial detection and traverse significant distances underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive review of the security architecture in Kathua. The article emphasizes that Kathua falls under the Area of Responsibility (AoR) of the 29 Infantry Division of the Western Command’s 9 Corps, headquartered in Yol, Himachal Pradesh. This arrangement places Kathua at the periphery of the 9 Corps’ conventional operations mandate, resulting in a diffused focus on counter-insurgency efforts. The 9 Corps was originally raised in 2005 to relieve the 16 Corps of the IB sector, allowing the latter to concentrate on conventional operations. However, the current operational structure appears to have inadvertently created a vulnerability that Pakistani terrorist groups are actively exploiting. The article further details how the terrorists were initially detected by villagers but were able to evade capture due to the lack of adequate response capabilities from the local police and Special Operations Group (SOG). These forces, lacking night-vision capabilities and the resources to establish effective cordons, were unable to prevent the terrorists from escaping and moving towards the higher reaches of Kathua. The delay in mobilizing specialized counter-terrorism units, such as the CRPF, BSF, and NSG, allowed the terrorists to gain a significant head start, highlighting the need for a more rapid and coordinated response mechanism. Once the infiltrating terrorists reach the Billawar-Machhedi belt in the higher reaches of Kathua, they can disperse into neighboring districts like Kishtwar and Doda, or even lie low in Himachal Pradesh, further complicating the task of tracking and neutralizing them. The villagers have reported multiple sightings of terrorist groups moving through the Kathua hinterland, but the security establishment's response, in terms of surveillance, intelligence gathering, and ambushes, has been inadequate. This has created a sense of frustration and concern among the local population, who are increasingly feeling vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
The withdrawal of the Counter-Insurgency Force (CIF) Uniform from Reasi-Udhampur to Eastern Ladakh following the 2020 Galwan clashes has further exacerbated the security situation in the region. This redeployment created a vacuum south of Rajouri-Pooch, which was subsequently exploited by Pakistani terrorists supported by an entrenched over-ground worker (OGW) network. The article argues that a similar vacuum exists in the hinterland of the Kathua IB, resulting in a slow, ponderous, and costly mobilization of security forces whenever terrorists are sighted. Veteran Army officers have pointed out the need for a review of Kathua’s operational jurisdictions to address the dualities of command and control. The article quotes Lt. Gen. DS Hooda (retd.), who commanded the 16 Corps and Northern Command, as suggesting the possibility of transferring some elements from the 9 Corps to the operational command of the 16 Corps for counter-insurgency operations in Kathua. This would streamline command and control, improve coordination, and ensure a more focused and effective response to terrorist threats. Maj. Gen. Raj Mehta (retd.), a former chief of staff at 9 Corps HQs, emphasizes the need for a thorough assessment of the ground in Kathua, including the identification of vulnerable areas and an understanding of the sociological, educational, and demographic profile of the region. He also raises questions about the adequacy of police presence in Kathua, the existence of village defence groups (VDGs), and the issuance of licenses for weapons to ex-servicemen. Furthermore, he suggests that if the 9 Corps is to be made responsible for the counter-insurgency grid, its force levels need to be augmented to ensure that it has the resources and capabilities to effectively carry out its mandate. The security establishment's response to the infiltration attempts in Kathua has been criticized as being reactive rather than proactive. The reliance on villagers for initial detection, the slow mobilization of security forces, and the lack of a coordinated command structure have all contributed to the terrorists' ability to evade capture and move deeper into the region. The article highlights the importance of intelligence gathering, surveillance, and human intelligence in preventing infiltration and disrupting terrorist activities. It also emphasizes the need for a robust counter-insurgency grid that can detect, track, and neutralize terrorists before they can reach the higher reaches of Kathua.
The article concludes by raising questions about the effectiveness of the police and allied central armed police forces (CAPF) in securing the rear areas of Kathua. It also questions the vision of the Unified HQs for JK in addressing the security challenges in the region. The failure to establish a strong counter-insurgency grid in Kathua has created a vulnerability that Pakistani terrorist groups are actively exploiting, posing a significant threat to the security and stability of the region. To address this issue, the article recommends a comprehensive review of the security architecture in Kathua, including a streamlining of command and control, an augmentation of force levels, and an improvement in intelligence gathering and surveillance capabilities. The implementation of these measures is essential to prevent future infiltration attempts and ensure the safety and security of the local population. The article underscores the need for a multi-faceted approach to counter-insurgency in Kathua, involving the Army, police, CAPF, and local communities. This approach should focus on intelligence gathering, border management, area domination, and community engagement. By working together, these stakeholders can create a more secure and resilient environment in Kathua, making it more difficult for Pakistani terrorist groups to operate in the region. Furthermore, the article emphasizes the importance of addressing the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion. By providing economic opportunities and promoting social inclusion, the government can reduce the appeal of terrorism and create a more stable and prosperous society. The article serves as a stark reminder of the ongoing security challenges in Jammu and Kashmir and the need for a vigilant and proactive approach to counter-insurgency. By addressing the security gaps in Kathua and strengthening the overall security architecture in the region, the government can create a more secure and stable environment for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The article advocates for a strategic realignment of operational jurisdictions, possibly shifting some elements from 9 Corps to 16 Corps, to better coordinate counter-insurgency efforts in Kathua. This would ensure that the area receives the focused attention it requires to effectively combat terrorist threats. Ultimately, the safety and security of Kathua, and by extension, the broader region, hinge on a cohesive, well-coordinated, and adequately resourced security apparatus capable of proactively addressing the evolving threats posed by Pakistani terrorist groups.
The lack of coordination between different security agencies, stemming from the divided command structure, significantly hampers effective counter-terrorism operations. The article highlights that the International Border falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs, with the BSF guarding the border, while the area beyond is under 9 Corps, which falls under the Ministry of Defence. This contrasts with the situation under 16 Corps, where both the LoC and the hinterland are under the Army's control, fostering better coordination. The DGP of J&K's effective coordination with the 16 Corps HQ further underscores the importance of unified command. The geographical distance of 9 Corps HQ at Yol adds to the challenge, making real-time coordination more difficult. Transferring some elements of 9 Corps to the operational command of 16 Corps for CI-Ops in Kathua would streamline the chain of command and expedite responses to security threats. The article also calls for a comprehensive assessment of the ground situation in Kathua, emphasizing the need to identify vulnerable areas and understand the sociological, educational, and demographic dynamics. This holistic approach would enable security forces to tailor their strategies and resources to the specific needs of the region. Strengthening the local police presence and establishing village defense groups (VDGs) could also enhance the security apparatus at the grassroots level. Equipping ex-servicemen with licensed weapons would further bolster the defensive capabilities of local communities. However, the article cautions that if 9 Corps is to retain responsibility for the counter-insurgency grid, its force levels must be augmented to ensure adequate resources and manpower. The Galwan fallout serves as a reminder of the potential consequences of security vacuums. The redeployment of the Counter-Insurgency Force (CIF) Uniform to Eastern Ladakh created an opening that Pakistani terrorists exploited, underscoring the need for a consistent and robust security presence. In conclusion, the article provides a nuanced analysis of the security challenges facing Kathua, highlighting the interplay of operational jurisdictions, command structures, and resource allocation. It calls for a strategic reassessment of the security architecture in the region, emphasizing the importance of coordination, intelligence gathering, and community engagement. By addressing these issues, the government can create a more secure and resilient environment for the people of Kathua and prevent future terrorist infiltration.
Source: Pakistani terrorists exploit lack of 'reception area' in Kathua