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The Balochistan conflict, a long-standing struggle for autonomy and recognition, is not simply a matter of insurgency that can be resolved through military force. The recent hijacking of the Jaffar Express by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) serves as a stark reminder of the deep-seated grievances and frustrations fueling the Baloch independence movement. While the immediate crisis may have ended in a violent confrontation, the act itself will undoubtedly become a symbol of Baloch resistance against what they perceive as oppressive rule. The Baloch struggle has persisted, in various forms, since 1948, when Pakistan forcibly annexed the princely state of Kalat, encompassing much of Balochistan. The current phase of the movement, ongoing for the past two decades, demonstrates the resilience and determination of the Baloch people in the face of sustained military pressure from the Pakistani army. As articulated in the author's previous work, "Pakistan: The Balochistan Conundrum," the roots of Baloch alienation are deeply embedded in issues of identity and consciousness. These grievances stem from historical injustices, such as the forcible accession of Kalat and the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2006, as well as contemporary concerns, including the lack of consultation in mega-projects like Gwadar and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the pervasive administrative and political marginalization of the Baloch people. Furthermore, the brutal tactics of enforced disappearances and the “kill and dump” policy employed by the army have exacerbated the sense of injustice and fueled resentment among the Baloch population. These issues cannot be dismissed or overshadowed by discussions of development goals, as they represent fundamental challenges to the Baloch identity and their perception of being treated as second-class citizens within Pakistan. The nature of the insurgency has evolved over time. While earlier iterations were primarily tribal-based, the current movement reflects a growing political awareness and mobilization among the Baloch middle class. This shift indicates that the struggle is no longer limited to a few tribal leaders seeking to preserve their traditional authority, but has transformed into a broader nationalist movement with widespread support among the Baloch population. This heightened political consciousness underscores the need for a political solution that addresses the underlying grievances and aspirations of the Baloch people. The Pakistani state, particularly the army, often views the insurgency as a mere law and order problem requiring a military response. This approach fails to recognize the depth and significance of Baloch nationalism and the extent of their alienation from the state. The army’s inability or unwillingness to understand that the insurgency is a consequence of a deeper political problem is a major obstacle to finding a lasting resolution. The fundamental issue lies in the nature of the Pakistani state and its capacity to equitably accommodate minority nationalities like the Baloch, or whether they will be forced to live under the dominance of the Punjabi majority. The army, being predominantly Punjabi, is often perceived as a force of oppression rather than a protector in Balochistan and other minority regions. This perception further fuels resentment and contributes to the cycle of violence and mistrust.
The consequences of attempting to address a political problem with military means are evident in the ongoing conflict. The International Crisis Group (ICG) highlighted this issue in its 2006 report, "Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan," noting that while the military can maintain territorial control through force, it cannot defeat an insurgency that enjoys local support. The ICG also warned that such policies would likely undermine the remaining vestiges of state legitimacy in the province and that the insurgency would not recede, nor would Islamabad succeed in dampening Baloch resistance. A fundamental flaw in Pakistan’s national framework is its failure to acknowledge and accommodate its ethnic diversity and the economic disparities among its provinces. The country has attempted to construct a national ideology based on religious homogeneity, neglecting the diverse identities and interests of its various ethnic and regional groups. This approach has led to internal conflicts and instability, as evidenced by the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, despite a shared religion. The remaining part of Pakistan continues to grapple with ethnic and sectarian conflicts, terrorism, and economic inequality, all of which are exacerbated by the failure to address the underlying political and economic grievances of its diverse populations. Currently, the interests of the Pakistani state and the Baloch people are diametrically opposed. The Baloch are fighting to protect their identity, culture, history, geography, and economic rights, while the state, including the army, is primarily concerned with creating a homogenous Islamic nation, politically marginalizing the Baloch, and exploiting their natural resources. This fundamental conflict of interests makes it difficult to find common ground and necessitates a fundamental shift in the state’s approach to Balochistan. The critical question is whether the situation in Balochistan is irretrievable for Pakistan. Can the insurgency be resolved through economic development and improvements in social indicators? Will the state end its policy of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings and release those held in illegal detention? Given its current mindset, it seems unlikely that the army will reverse its course in Balochistan. For many Baloch, the struggle has transcended purely economic concerns. Pushed to the brink, facing marginalization and subjugation, an increasing number of Baloch are taking up arms to defend their identity and their homeland. While the current level of conflict may not pose an immediate threat to the integrity of the Pakistani state, the ongoing violence will continue to erode the country’s stability and internal cohesion.
Although Pakistan's military possesses superior resources and training, capable of maintaining control over the territory, it is unlikely to ultimately subdue a people determined to protect their identity and their homeland. The most probable scenario is a continuation of protracted violence in Balochistan, which, even at current levels, will continue to undermine Pakistan from within. Therefore, military force alone will not break Baloch resistance. Pakistan must be prepared for a prolonged struggle unless there is a fundamental shift in the army's approach to the Balochistan issue. In the long term, the Pakistani state must find a compromise with the Baloch. Continuing to pursue a military solution to a political problem may provide short-term tactical advantages, but it cannot be a sustainable long-term solution. A key factor in Pakistan's future development will be finding a just solution to the Balochistan conundrum, one that prioritizes the Baloch people and their identity over the province's resources. Failure to do so will inevitably exacerbate the crisis in Balochistan, potentially leading to dire consequences for Pakistan. The long-term stability and prosperity of Pakistan depend on its ability to address the root causes of the Balochistan conflict and to create a political environment where the Baloch people feel respected, valued, and empowered to participate fully in the development of their region and their country. This requires a fundamental shift in the state's approach, from one of control and exploitation to one of partnership and mutual respect. Only then can Pakistan hope to resolve the Balochistan crisis and build a more inclusive and stable future for all its citizens. The author's perspective, as a member of the National Security Advisory Board, highlights the strategic importance of resolving the Balochistan issue for the overall security and stability of Pakistan. A failure to address the underlying political and economic grievances of the Baloch people will continue to fuel resentment, instability, and violence, undermining Pakistan's efforts to achieve its long-term development goals and to play a constructive role in the region.
Source: Baloch insurgency is not the real problem, it is result of a political problem