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The Border Gavaskar Trophy 2024-25, a highly anticipated five-Test series, lived up to its hype, primarily due to the intense battle between two formidable pace attacks led by Jasprit Bumrah (India) and Pat Cummins (Australia). This series was significant not only for the cricketing rivalry but also because it marked a potential final encounter between some of the sport's greatest players. The added incentive of a World Test Championship final berth heightened the stakes considerably. While the commercial draw may have centered around Virat Kohli and Steven Smith, the on-field narrative was unequivocally dominated by the pace bowlers. The introduction of a new Kookaburra ball, featuring a more pronounced seam and additional lacquer, coupled with unusually grassy Australian pitches, created exceptionally challenging conditions for batsmen. This resulted in a staggering 25.1% of deliveries bowled by seamers eliciting false shots, making it the most difficult series for batsmen in Australia since 2006/07.
The statistics paint a clear picture of the bowlers' dominance. The top seven batsmen averaged a mere 31.43 runs, the second-lowest in a series since 2006/07, surpassed only by the 2018/19 Border-Gavaskar Trophy where Australia faced a depleted batting line-up. The series highlighted the crucial role of depth and experience within the bowling attacks. While Cummins had the support of Mitchell Starc, Josh Hazlewood, and Scott Boland, India's support for Bumrah proved significantly weaker as the ball aged and lost its shine. Australia's change bowlers secured 32 wickets at an average of 21.96, with Boland alone claiming 21 wickets at a phenomenal average of 13.19. In stark contrast, India's change bowlers managed only 20 wickets at 36.10. This disparity underscores a major tactical flaw in India's approach.
India's selection decisions throughout the series were perplexing and repeatedly questioned. Their consistent choice of three seamers, an uncapped seam-bowling all-rounder, and a finger spinner proved ineffective. The addition of a second finger spinner in the final two Tests, primarily to bolster batting, further exacerbated the issue. The pitches offered little assistance to spin bowlers, as evidenced by Nathan Lyon’s unusually low workload—his lightest since his debut year. Spinners bowled a total of 51 overs across the five Tests, the lowest since 2006/07, and induced false shots far less frequently than fast bowlers. This effectively reduced India to a three-man pace attack as the series progressed, severely limiting their options.
A further breakdown reveals the contrasting performances of both teams' pace attacks with the new ball (overs 1-30) and old ball (overs 31-80). While both teams' seamers had similar figures with the new ball, Bumrah's exceptional skills were evident. His new-ball burst in Perth, where he claimed five top-order wickets across two innings, propelled India's only victory. Mohammed Siraj also performed well with the new ball, but once the ball aged, the experience and understanding of Australian conditions became the decisive factor. Australia's seamers averaged 16.88 with the older ball and struck every 34.9 balls, compared to India's 30.31 and 51.4 respectively. Boland's contribution in this phase was particularly impactful, with 12 wickets at an average of 8.33 and a false shot induced every third ball faced by Indian batters.
The contrasting batting approaches of both teams also played a pivotal role. Australia's aggressive batting, especially Travis Head's outstanding performances (190 runs at a strike rate of 103.82 between overs 31-80), allowed them to consistently post large first-innings totals (over 400 in Adelaide and Brisbane), putting India on the back foot. In contrast, India’s first-innings scores were significantly lower (150, 180, 185), often after losing early wickets. This difference in batting strategies allowed Australia to employ more attacking field settings, further exploiting India's bowling limitations. India's failure to build on their new-ball success highlights a critical deficiency: a lack of depth and support for Bumrah's outstanding performance. This was not a new issue; similar bowling combinations under Ravi Shastri and Rahul Dravid resulted in better success due to a more rounded seam attack and better all-round bowling support from Hardik Pandya and Shardul Thakur.
The series underscores the importance of a well-rounded pace attack. Gautam Gambhir, the team’s management, faced a crucial decision: prioritize batting depth or a more balanced seam attack. The choice to maintain batting depth proved costly. The analysis shows that while India played four specialist seamers on five occasions under Shastri and Dravid, achieving a 60% win rate, their current strategy failed to yield the same results. India's inability to dismiss the Australian side twice in a match consistently undermined their chances of victory, leading to the final scoreline accurately reflecting their deficiencies. Siraj lacked the control of an experienced bowler like Shami with the older ball, while the remaining seamers struggled in Australian conditions once the new ball lost its shine. Nitish Kumar Reddy, the designated fourth seamer, proved inadequate, highlighting the critical need for a more experienced and effective pace bowling unit. Bumrah's exceptional performance, while remarkable, was ultimately insufficient to overcome India's systemic shortcomings, culminating in his injury during the final match.
Bumrah's individual performance was extraordinary, achieving 32 wickets at 13.06—the most by an Indian bowler in an away series and jointly the most by an Indian seamer ever. His effectiveness extended across all phases of the game. However, the lack of support from the rest of the seam attack, who collectively managed 40 wickets at 34.82, proved decisive. Bumrah's impact on Australia's top seven was especially significant, dismissing them 26 times at a collective average of 12.26. Only Sam Konstas averaged above 21 against him. This performance is comparable to Courtney Walsh's remarkable feat in 2000, but unlike Walsh, who had the support of Curtly Ambrose, Bumrah's efforts were ultimately in vain, highlighting the critical need for a deeper and more consistent pace bowling attack in the Indian team's strategy moving forward.
Source: BGT 2024-25 - A contest headlined by two pace attacks