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The complex geopolitical dynamics between Pakistan and China are brought into sharp focus by recent reports suggesting Pakistan's request for a second-strike nuclear capability from China. This request, seemingly paradoxical given Pakistan's professed first-strike nuclear policy against India and its precarious economic and political situation, has ignited considerable debate. The alleged quid pro quo for this unprecedented request is the granting of access to the strategically vital Gwadar Port to China for the establishment of a permanent military base. This situation highlights the intricate interplay of national security concerns, economic dependencies, and regional power struggles in South Asia. The reported rejection of Pakistan's request by China underscores the potential risks and complexities involved in such a high-stakes negotiation.
The strategic importance of Gwadar Port cannot be overstated. Located on the Arabian Sea, it sits at a crucial juncture of international trade routes, offering China a potential foothold for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and enhancing its maritime influence in the Indian Ocean region. For Pakistan, Gwadar represents a significant economic opportunity, potentially transforming its economy through increased trade and investment. However, the port's strategic location also makes it a potential flashpoint, raising concerns about regional stability and the potential for escalating tensions with other regional powers, most notably India. Pakistan's decision to leverage access to Gwadar to secure a second-strike capability reflects its deep-seated anxieties about its regional security environment and its perceived vulnerability to a first strike from India.
The question of whether Pakistan truly needs a second-strike capability from China is central to understanding the motivations behind this bold request. Pakistan already possesses a substantial nuclear arsenal, developed with significant assistance from China. Some analysts even suggest that China has already provided Pakistan with tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). Given this existing cooperation and Pakistan's established nuclear deterrence strategy—while not adhering to a 'no-first-use' policy, as India does—the request for an enhanced second-strike capability seems rather peculiar. It raises the question of whether this demand is a genuine strategic imperative or a shrewd bargaining tactic to extract greater economic and military concessions from China in exchange for allowing the establishment of a Chinese naval base at Gwadar.
The discussion around a second-strike capability inevitably touches upon the evolving nuclear doctrines and strategies of both Pakistan and India. While Pakistan’s doctrine has evolved from a potential first-use scenario (based on four red lines identified by Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, including territorial loss, economic collapse, military attrition, and regime instability) to a full-spectrum deterrence posture, the concerns remain about India's growing nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile defense program. The ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the Russia-Ukraine war further underscore Pakistan's perceived vulnerability and its desire to enhance its security posture. This heightened awareness of potential threats has likely fueled the demand for a more robust second-strike capacity, potentially involving the acquisition of nuclear submarines and more powerful warheads.
The argument that the pursuit of a second-strike capability is primarily about acquiring nuclear submarines to deploy the Babur-3 cruise missile, while valid, does not fully explain Pakistan's request from China. Pakistan already possesses missiles with longer ranges (like the Shaheen-III), capable of fulfilling a second-strike role. This suggests the demand is not merely about acquiring a new delivery system, but about securing a higher order of nuclear capability, encompassing potentially more powerful and destructive warheads. This ambition could be driven by a perceived shift in India’s nuclear warfighting strategy, although publicly India maintains its ‘no-first-use’ policy. The underlying motive could also be to ensure a survivable second-strike capability, one resilient against India's developing ballistic missile defense systems.
China's perspective is equally crucial. While China has been a long-standing partner in Pakistan's nuclear development, providing technology and materials, the reported rejection of Pakistan's request indicates potential concerns. These concerns might stem from China’s international reputation as a nuclear weapons state, its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the potential international repercussions of further escalating the nuclear arms race in South Asia. However, China's past actions, notably its support for Pakistan and North Korea's nuclear programs, suggests a pragmatic approach to nuclear proliferation, prioritizing its own strategic interests above strict adherence to international norms. This paradoxical situation leaves open the possibility of future negotiations and adjustments, depending on the evolving geopolitical landscape.
In conclusion, Pakistan's request for a second-strike nuclear capability from China, using the strategic asset of Gwadar Port as leverage, reveals the intricate complexities of regional power dynamics and national security concerns in South Asia. While the request's apparent rejection by China highlights the inherent risks and challenges of such a proposition, the underlying motivations, involving economic dependencies, regional rivalries, and the pursuit of enhanced military capabilities, are undeniable. The situation underscores the need for cautious diplomacy and effective strategies to prevent further escalation and maintain regional stability. The future of this intricate negotiation and its implications for regional security remain to be seen, but the stakes are undoubtedly high.
Source: Why is Pakistan asking China for second-strike capability?