 |
|
The proposed "One Nation, One Election" (ONOE) bill in India has ignited a fierce debate, pitting the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) against opposition parties. The BJP argues that simultaneous elections for national and state legislatures will streamline the process, reducing costs and time. However, critics contend that this move is strategically designed to benefit the BJP, potentially marginalizing regional parties. The core of the opposition's concern lies in the observed correlation between Lok Sabha (national) and state assembly election results when held concurrently. Numerous examples, particularly from the 2024 elections in Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh, illustrate this trend. In these states, the party winning the state assembly elections also secured the majority of Lok Sabha seats, suggesting a significant alignment in voter preferences when elections are held simultaneously.
A detailed analysis of vote shares and absolute vote counts from these states further reinforces this correlation. For instance, in Odisha, the BJP's vote share in the assembly and Lok Sabha elections was remarkably similar, within a few percentage points. The same pattern was observed in Andhra Pradesh, where the winning alliances' vote shares remained consistent across both election types. This close mirroring of results isn't unique to the 2024 elections; similar trends were observed during simultaneous elections in 2014 and 2019. This consistency raises concerns among opposition parties that simultaneous elections effectively translate state-level victories into substantial gains in the Lok Sabha, thereby disproportionately favouring nationally dominant parties.
The phenomenon of "split voting," where voters choose different parties in state and national elections, is relatively rare in India, particularly when simultaneous polls are conducted. While certain states like Delhi have demonstrated split voting tendencies, many others, including Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Uttarakhand, and Maharashtra (with the exception of the recent elections), exhibit a strong consistency in voting patterns across both levels of elections. This consistency highlights a key argument supporting the concerns of the opposition – that simultaneous elections minimize the opportunity for voters to express separate preferences for state and national governance, thus potentially reinforcing the dominance of a single party across multiple levels.
A historical examination sheds light on this dynamic. From 1952 to 1967, India held simultaneous elections, a period marked by the Congress Party's overwhelming dominance. This era saw the Congress consistently securing over 350 Lok Sabha seats, a reflection of their strong state-level leadership and minimal competition. However, this dominance shattered in the 1967 elections, with the Congress failing to secure a majority in several states, leading to the emergence of non-Congress governments and a significant decline in their Lok Sabha seats. This period marked the rise of regional parties and the fracturing of the Congress's national hegemony, illustrating that periods of consistent simultaneous elections do not inherently guarantee the success of the strongest national party.
The current situation presents a complex picture. While limited simultaneous polls in recent years reveal a strong correlation between state and national results, it's inaccurate to conclude that this inherently benefits the BJP. The historical data, spanning periods of both simultaneous and staggered elections, suggests that the stronger party in each state, be it national or regional, tends to gain a larger share of Lok Sabha seats. The absence of widespread split voting further reinforces this trend. Consequently, strong regional parties might actually gain more Lok Sabha seats under ONOE compared to staggered elections.
However, a critical point remains unanswered: How would ONOE impact states with bipolar contests, where parties like the BJP and Congress enjoy comparable support bases? States such as Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, and Chhattisgarh fall into this category, making the outcome difficult to predict. The inherent complexity of the Indian political landscape and the diverse voting behaviors across different regions make it challenging to ascertain the true impact of ONOE on all political parties with certainty. While the BJP might gain an advantage in certain scenarios, a conclusive assessment requires more comprehensive analysis, particularly regarding the dynamics in states where electoral competition is fierce and voter preferences are less predictable.
Ultimately, the debate surrounding ONOE is far from settled. While concerns regarding the potential marginalization of regional parties are legitimate and warrant careful consideration, a complete understanding of the potential consequences necessitates a more in-depth analysis of diverse electoral trends and their interplay with the proposed reform. The author's conclusion that strong regional parties may benefit unexpectedly highlights the nuanced nature of this far-reaching political decision and the unpredictable consequences that could arise from its implementation.
Source: BJP Or Regional Parties, Who Really Benefits From One Nation, One Election?