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The practice of one candidate contesting from multiple constituencies (OCMC) in India's electoral system has sparked significant debate. While initially unrestricted, a 1996 amendment to the Representation of the People Act limited candidates to two constituencies, yet the issue persists, leading to numerous by-elections and raising concerns about fairness, cost, and democratic principles. This essay will delve into the various aspects of OCMC, exploring its historical context, its detrimental effects on the electoral process, and potential solutions for reform. The article highlights the significant financial burden imposed by frequent by-elections, a burden ultimately shouldered by the taxpayer. The cost of holding these elections, though seemingly small compared to the overall election expenditure, adds up substantially when considering the multitude of by-elections necessitated by OCMC. Furthermore, the practice significantly impacts political parties, demanding additional financial resources and potentially influencing election outcomes.
A crucial concern is the inherent bias created by the system. By-elections triggered by OCMC often favor the ruling party, as they possess more resources and established networks to mobilize support. This creates an uneven playing field, disadvantaging opposition parties and undermining the democratic ideal of fair competition. This systematic bias further exacerbates existing power imbalances within the political landscape, leaving opposition parties at a disadvantage and potentially hindering effective representation of diverse viewpoints. The financial burden also disproportionately affects the candidates who have lost in the initial election, forcing them to expend more resources in subsequent by-elections. This creates a situation where candidates may be forced to engage in a prolonged and financially straining electoral battle. This creates an added layer of difficulty for candidates, especially those from smaller parties or with limited resources. The inherent bias and increased financial pressures associated with by-elections due to OCMC create a cycle that further entrenches existing political power structures and creates obstacles for effective democratic participation.
Beyond the financial and partisan implications, OCMC raises fundamental questions about democratic representation. The principle of ‘one person, one vote’ implies a direct link between a voter and their chosen representative. However, OCMC introduces a layer of complexity and potential distrust, as a candidate might prioritize their strategic political interests over the needs of any single constituency, potentially shifting their focus after securing multiple seats and vacating those of lesser importance. The practice contradicts the essence of representative democracy, where elected officials are expected to directly address the concerns and interests of their constituents. By contesting multiple seats, a candidate potentially neglects the specific needs and priorities of a constituency in favor of broader political goals, hindering effective representation and undermining the trust between elected officials and their constituents. This raises concerns about the fidelity of the representative system and the quality of representation provided to various constituencies.
The issue of OCMC is further complicated by its interaction with the broader political culture in India. The prevalence of leader-centric parties often contributes to the use of OCMC as a strategy to ensure the continued presence of prominent leaders within the political system, even if they lose in one or more constituencies. This highlights the interplay between political strategy and democratic principles, where the pursuit of power may overshadow concerns about effective governance and fair representation. The practice therefore often serves the interests of powerful politicians and their parties rather than serving the interests of their constituents. This focus on political expediency and self-preservation is contrary to the democratic ideal of serving the public interest.
Addressing the issue of OCMC requires a multifaceted approach. The amendment of Section 33(7) of the RP Act 1951 to explicitly ban OCMC is a crucial step. The recovery of by-election costs from candidates who vacate seats could serve as a deterrent; however, this measure may be less effective against wealthy candidates and well-funded political parties who can easily afford these costs. More effective solutions could involve adjusting the timing of by-elections, potentially delaying them by a year. This would provide a more level playing field for all participating parties, offering a more fair and balanced electoral process. By extending the time frame between elections and by-elections, there is a greater degree of fairness and prevents the exploitation of advantages that the ruling party has in relation to financial and infrastructural resources.
While OCMC is not unique to India, most European democracies have moved away from the practice. International experience underscores the importance of clear representation and accountability, highlighting the need for reforms. The practice of OCMC is deeply rooted in the existing power dynamics of the Indian political landscape and therefore implementing change requires not only legislative action but a commitment to changing the very norms and practices that uphold the current system. In the end, reform is not only about addressing the logistical and financial challenges of by-elections; it’s about upholding the fundamental principles of democratic representation and ensuring that the electoral system effectively serves the interests of the people. As the authors of the article suggest, enforcing a “one candidate, one constituency” rule is a necessary step towards realizing a more equitable and accountable electoral system.
Source: Let’s talk about ‘one candidate, multiple constituencies’